We set out an account of how self-domestication plays a crucial role in the evolution of language. In doing so, we focus on the growing body of work that treats language structure as emerging from the process of cultural transmission. We argue that a full recognition of the importance of cultural transmission fundamentally changes the kind of questions we should be asking regarding the biological basis of language structure. If we think of language structure as reflecting an accumulated set of (...) changes in our genome, then we might ask something like, “What are the genetic bases of language structure and why were they selected?” However, if cultural evolution can account for language structure, then this question no longer applies. Instead, we face the task of accounting for the origin of the traits that enabled that process of structure-creating cultural evolution to get started in the first place. In light of work on cultural evolution, then, the new question for biological evolution becomes, “How did those precursor traits evolve?” We identify two key precursor traits: the transmission of the communication system through learning; and the ability to infer the communicative intent associated with a signal or action. We then describe two comparative case studies—the Bengalese finch and the domestic dog—in which parallel traits can be seen emerging following domestication. Finally, we turn to the role of domestication in human evolution. We argue that the cultural evolution of language structure has its origin in an earlier process of self-domestication. (shrink)

This is a study of the attributes problem in the metaphysics of Spinoza, using the recent literature ascribing an absolute idealism to Spinoza as a point of departure.

James Thomas has made yet another valiant attempt to solve the problem in Spinoza of the relation between the infinite attributes of Substance, to which von Tschirnhausen drew attention in Eps. 64 and 65, and to which the answer offered by Spinoza in Ep. 66 seems unsatisfactory. Thomas sets out from an appreciative and fair summary of what I have written on the subject, and then offers an alternative interpretation of Ep. 66 which he says I do (...) not consider. He claims that his interpretation is consistent with my reading of Spinoza as an absolute idealist. I am not sure in what sense he thinks I attribute absolute idealism to Spinoza, but that is a question peripheral to what I wish to discuss here; for whether it is relevant or not, I fear Thomas’s proffered interpretation of Ep. 66 will not serve to resolve Tschirnhausen’s difficulties. (shrink)

The second volume of Carol Keene’s selected letters of F.H. Bradley starts with one from William James, explaining some of his criticisms of the Absolute. An earlier letter of Bradley’s argued that his Absolute was the very condition of freedom and novelty, contrary to James’ criticism, and James had to admit that his focus had been on the Absolute of Josiah Royce, a colleague at Harvard. However, James understood Royce’s Absolute well, because they gave a course (...) together, with James teaching the first half on pluralism; and Royce, the second, on monism. “You will forgive me,” was Bradley’s reply, “when I say that I smiled at the idea of the bane & the antidote being put before your students in due order”. (shrink)

The second volume of Carol Keene’s selected letters of F.H. Bradley starts with one from William James, explaining some of his criticisms of the Absolute. An earlier letter of Bradley’s argued that his Absolute was the very condition of freedom and novelty, contrary to James’ criticism, and James had to admit that his focus had been on the Absolute of Josiah Royce, a colleague at Harvard. However, James understood Royce’s Absolute well, because they gave a course (...) together, with James teaching the first half on pluralism; and Royce, the second, on monism. “You will forgive me,” was Bradley’s reply, “when I say that I smiled at the idea of the bane & the antidote being put before your students in due order”. (shrink)

This paper explores the organisation of scholarly articles in educational studies in the UK through an analysis of the outputs of six key journals. Using citation networks and text analyses it examines connections that are made between papers, journals, authors and the themes discussed in the six journals. Scholarly papers are particularly suitable for this kind of analysis because of the expectation that authors 'locate' their work within existing knowledge, making explicit connections between their contribution and the field (or discipline) (...) in which they are working. This analysis utilises these connections in order to understand how papers in disciplinary and non-disciplinary journals relate to one another in terms of the bodies of knowledge on which they draw, where papers are then cited, and the degree to which authors cross disciplinary boundaries or remain within their 'parent' discipline. (shrink)

Je suggère dans cet article que le modèle de la défense par Descartes de la science de la Renaissance pourrait être celui par Thomas d’Aquin de la science « aristotélicienne » du treizième siècle, n’était le fait que c’est la cohérence de la volonté qui prit en charge chez Descartes le rôle de la consistance des concepts comme facteur contrôlant dans les analyses de tous les types de science. En conséquence, la science nouvelle pouvait intégrer la conscience des idées (...) platoniciennes et la divisibilité de l’espace euclidien comme un apport tout aussi valide dans la connaissance dialectique de l’expérience sensorielle. On peut interpréter les premiers arguments invitant à douter de la réalité de l’expérience sensorielle et de la raison comme une façon de scinder l’expérience de la volonté dans l’affirmation et la négation de la nature d’un objet, ce qui sera le sujet d’une enquête ultérieure. (shrink)

La doctrine thomiste de l’unité de la forme substantielle explique l’unité près de l’âme cartésienne avec le corps, mais pour leur indépendance Paul Hoffman a conseillé la lecture pluraliste du composite attribuable à Guillaume d’Ockham et Duns Scot. Principalement pour lier la pensée cartésienne à une tradition éthique plus étendue, je suggère que la doctrine thomiste pourrait être développée pour répondre aux objections de Marleen Rozemond à une lecture scolaire si la forme substantielle est considérée comme l’argument d’incliner le conatus (...) ou de l’appétit de l’existence. (shrink)

The dauer larva is a specialized third‐larval stage of Caenorhabditis elegans that is long‐lived and resistant to environmental insult. The dauer larva is formed in response to a high external concentration of a constitu‐tively secreted pheromone. Response to the dauer‐inducing pheromone of C. elegans is a promising genetic model for metazoan chemosensory transduction. More than 20 genes have been identified that are required for normal pheromone response. The functions of these genes include production of the pheromone, exposure of sensory neuron (...) endings to the environment, structural and functional integrity of those sensory endings, and the capacity of sensory neurons to make appropriate output. Genetic evidence suggests that two partially redundant sensory pathways act in concert to control dauer formation. At least two classes of chemosensory neurons, ADF and ASI, are implicated in the pheromone response. On the basis of on these findings, a speculative model for the pheromone response is proposed. In this model, the neurons ADF and ASI are pheromone sensors that repress dauer formation in the absence of pheromone and dere‐press dauer formation in response to pheromone. It is currently unclear whether or not the two genetically defined sensory pathways both act in ADF and ASI. (shrink)

Mutations in the daf-2 and age-1 genes cause constitutive dauer larva formation and double adult life span in C. elegans. Their effect on life span has excited considerable interest and their effect on dauer formation has facilitated rapid progress in their genetic and molecular analysis. Two recent papers12,13 report that daf-2 encodes a member of the insulin-receptor family and that age-1 encodes a PI3 kinase subunit, a second-messenger producing enzyme known to act downstream of the mammalian insulin receptor. These findings (...) provide the first mechanistic insight into the well-established link between metabolism and aging. BioEssays 20:113–115, 1998. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

In the summer of 1893, following the first publication of F.H. Bradley’s Appearance and Reality, Edward Caird and Sir Henry Jones exchanged letters, with Caird bringing criticism to bear on Bradley’s work analogous to one of Hegel’s objections to Spinoza’s theory of the attributes of substance. Spinoza’s attributes of his one reality, or substance — i.e., extension and thought and infinitely many other attributes not directly known to us — each contain this reality, and they are each a way for (...) us to know it. Hegel objected that they each failed in this owing to the abstractness of Spinoza’s ideas of the attributes. Caird held that Bradley’s metaphysics also makes the idea of reality in this way opposed to its object. The idea fails to contain reality as concrete experience. (shrink)

Spinoza’s Letter 66 is written in response to a question raised by Tschirnhaus. The question is why does one’s mind in one attribute perceive only one’s body in another if one’s nature is expressed in modes of infinite attributes? Spinoza replies that “although each thing is expressed in infinite modes in the infinite intellect of God, the infinite ideas by which it is expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of a singular thing,” and he contends that these “infinite (...) ideas” constitute “an infinity of minds” or independent conceptions in God’s understanding. (shrink)

The issue addressed in this thesis is one in the absolute idealism of Spinoza. It is one of specifying an interpretation of substance-attribute identity as a solution to the problem of reconciling it with the diversity of the attributes and the oneness of substance. As a testing ground for any proposed solution, a list of questions is generated. Given the countable diversity of the attributes, can we conceive of the identity of each of them with the one substance? Why, if (...) I am identical to a mode of each of infinite attributes, do I perceive only a body? What is the rational explanation for the infinite countable diversity of the attributes and our being directly acquainted with only two? In what manner can we reconcile the divisibility of substance with the activity of thought? How does one reconcile the order of extension seeming to be one of external relations with the essentially internal order of any finite thinking thing? How does one reconcile the independent being of modes of extension with the truth-functionality of ideas? In what manner is it possible to understand the appearance of the uniqueness of the one thing conceived under the idea of the body and the one-among-severalness of the same thing conceived under the idea of the individual's mind? In what manner can it be said that substance, consisting of infinite attributes, is accurately and completely conceived through any one of them while each is conceptually independent of every other? How can the one thing which is mind and body be wholly and accurately conceived to be a mode of either of their respective attributes while modes of differing attributes are also conceptually independent? The interpretations of substance-attribute identity given by John Clark Murray, T. L. S. Sprigge, and Errol E. Harris, in their writings in which they advocate reading Spinoza as an absolute idealist, are argued to be disadvantageous in dealing with the evident parallelism of the attributes. Finally, a proposed solution, offered by an alternative absolute idealist interpretation of substance-attribute identity, is developed in response to each of the above questions. (shrink)

We observe that approaches to intersubjectivity, involving mirror neurons and involving emulation and prediction, have eclipsed discussion of those same mechanisms for achieving coordination between the two hemispheres of the human brain. We explore some of the implications of the suggestion that the mutual modelling of the two situated hemispheres is a productive place to start in understanding the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of cognition and of intersubjectivity.

This volume contains the papers from a day-long symposium at Queen’s University at Kingston, May 1991, edited by James Bradley. Although it is impossible for the book or this review to adequately convey the excitement that I felt during this symposium, the essays achieve their objective. As James Bradley explains in the preface, they are intended to convey “the continuing significance in philosophical debate” of F.H. Bradley’s contributions, along with the reactions to them of his contemporaries and immediate (...) successors, concerning metaphysics, epistemology and ethics, and this aim is satisfactorily met, James Bradley again remarks, if the contributors’ work helps to more closely align arguments in the history of philosophy with contemporary argument. This collection accomplishes this goal but also something more, as dealing with these issues in Bradley also enables the authors to develop philosophical perspectives of their own, with considerable contemporary significance. (shrink)

This is the most recent edition of Sameness and Substance, a version of which actually appeared even earlier as Identity and Spacio-Temporal Continuity of 1967. The main thesis of the work is that identity—along with the correlative concepts of substance and being the same particular, or more generally of being the same a as b—depends on the specification of the sort of thing instantiated by a and b. Wiggins calls this the “sortal dependency” thesis: in the case of an identity (...) of a and b, it is only correct to say a is the same f as b, where f is a certain predicate applicable to both a and b. Wiggins develops, in other words, Wittgenstein’s suggestion in the Tractatus—the identity symbolized in an equals sign, such as a = b, is meaningless unless it means simply f & f. An addition to this developing work of special note is the new chapter on personal identity. (shrink)

This study examined the effect of various antecedent variables on marketers’ perceptions of the role of ethics and socialresponsibility in the overall success of the firm. Variables examined included Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity, and Confucian dynamism), as well as corporate ethical values and enforcement ofan ethics code. Additionally, individual variables such as ethical idealism and relativism were included. Results indicated that most ofthese variables impacted marketers’ perceptions of the importance of ethics and social responsibility, (...) although to varying degrees. (shrink)

Many believe that the ethical problems of donation after cardiocirculatory death (DCD) have been "worked out" and that it is unclear why DCD should be resisted. In this paper we will argue that DCD donors may not yet be dead, and therefore that organ donation during DCD may violate the dead donor rule. We first present a description of the process of DCD and the standard ethical rationale for the practice. We then present our concerns with DCD, including the following: (...) irreversibility of absent circulation has not occurred and the many attempts to claim it has have all failed; conflicts of interest at all steps in the DCD process, including the decision to withdraw life support before DCD, are simply unavoidable; potentially harmful premortem interventions to preserve organ utility are not justifiable, even with the help of the principle of double effect; claims that DCD conforms with the intent of the law and current accepted medical standards are misleading and inaccurate; and consensus statements by respected medical groups do not change these arguments due to their low quality including being plagued by conflict of interest. Moreover, some arguments in favor of DCD, while likely true, are "straw-man arguments," such as the great benefit of organ donation. The truth is that honesty and trustworthiness require that we face these problems instead of avoiding them. We believe that DCD is not ethically allowable because it abandons the dead donor rule, has unavoidable conflicts of interests, and implements premortem interventions which can hasten death. These important points have not been, but need to be fully disclosed to the public and incorporated into fully informed consent. These are tall orders, and require open public debate. Until this debate occurs, we call for a moratorium on the practice of DCD. (shrink)